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"Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice
At Any Cost"? The Judicial Role
Revisited: Reflections on
Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment*
By HENRY J. ABRAHAM**
Introduction
As Raoul Berger's subtitle, The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, suggests, he endeavors to buttress the main theme of his
important, trenchant and controversial work by providing a pertinent
case study cum indictment. It is difficult to conceive of a more appro-
priate study with which to make his point, and Berger has indubitably
succeeded in advancing the desired indictment. There may well never
be a final or otherwise conclusive verdict from a jury of his peers; in-
deed, as post-publication deliberations have made clear, a hung jury is
certain.' But any genuinely objective, factual and rigorous examina-
tion of the debates and history of the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment demonstrates that the authors and supporters of that pro-
vision specifically rejected its application to segregated schools and the
franchise;2 that, to the contrary, they designed the Amendment "to
* R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
** James Hart Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia;
A.B., 1948, Kenyon College; M.A., 1949 Columbia University; Ph.D., 1952, University of
Pennsylvania; L.H.D., 1972, Kenyon College.
1. See, e.g., Clark, History and Constitutional Interpretation, 56 TEx. L. REV. 947, 960
(1978); Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or States-
man?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978); Nathanson, ConstitutionalInterpretation and the Democratic
Process, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978).
2. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 283-99, 363-72. In these chapters, Berger analyzes the
conflict between adherence to the "original intention" of the Amendment's framers and the
latter-day judicial policymaking of the Warren Court.
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leave suffrage and segregation beyond federal control, to leave it with
the States, where control over internal, domestic matters resided from
the beginning."' 3 The question of suffrage was addressed separately in
the Fifteenth Amendment4 a few years later, thus underscoring Ber-
ger's point.
To grant the correctness of his rigid historical interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and I do so, does not mean, however, that one
must necessarily embrace Berger's corollaries. As has been demon-
strated elsewhere, 5 1 have long disagreed with Berger's undiluted sup-
port for Professor Charles Fairman's view of the intention of the
Amendment's framers with regard to the "incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights via the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Although
Berger concurs with Fairman that "'[tihe freedom that states tradition-
ally have exercised to develop their own systems of administering jus-
tice, repeals any thought that. . . Congress would. . . have attempted
[to incorporate the Bill of Rights] . . . , [for] the country would not
have stood for it, the legislatures would not have ratified,' "7 a fair
reading of the same historical record justifies a contrary determina-
tion.8 Nor need one, and I emphatically do not, reject Professor Alex-
ander M. Bickel's conclusion that the authors of the Fourteenth
Amendment ultimately chose language which would be capable of
growth (or contraction, for that matter); that, consequently, "the record
of history, properly understood, left the way open to, in fact invited, a
decision based on the moral and material state of the Union in 1954,
3. Id. at 245.
4. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "Section 1: The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2: The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
5. See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 33-56 (3d ed. 1I477). This section of
the book examines the historical background of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
States.
6. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
7. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 156 (quoting Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 137 (1937)).
8. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 38-48. Contradicting Fairman's argument, this
section of the book concludes that "there seems little doubt that the Amendment's principal
framers and managers ... did believe the Bill of Rights to be made generally applicable to
the several states via Section ." Id. at 47-48.
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not 1866." 9 Bickel's view is especially notable given the results of his
painstaking research while serving as Justice Felix Frankfurter's law
clerk during the Court's deliberations leading to its decision in Brown v.
Board of Education."° In his report to "F.F." Bickel concluded that
there was "no evidence that the framers of the Amendment had in-
tended to prohibit school segregation;"'I that, in effect, "'it is impossi-
ble to conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be
abolished; impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it might be,
under the language they were adopting.' "12 Yet even the liberalist-
absolutist Justice Hugo Black, a strict constructionist, found justifica-
tion for growth in the tenets of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus
reluctantly joined the Court's unanimous Brown opinion. 3
It is one thing to recognize and grant growth potential in our basic
law; it is quite another, however, to endeavor to determine the constitu-
tionally permissible, let alone viable, parameters of such growth. And
there hangs the gravamen of the development of constitutional law and
constitutional history in general, and the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular. Thus, a good many thoughtful and qualified
observers of evolving racial segregation law, who have criticized Ber-
ger's reading of the genesis of the Amendment in relation to its historic
application in Brown as being far too constitutionally rigid and confin-
ing, are supportive, on the other hand, of his condemnation of the
Court's subsequent, expansive application of constitutional doctrine in
such Brown offspring as forced busing, 4 racial quotas, 5 and other in-
tegrative measures."
There is, of course, a crying need to find and establish lines and
limits between judicial "self-restraint" and "judicial activism", or be-
9. A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 261 (1965). Bickel was referring
specifically to the Court's seminal desegregation decisions in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 655 (1975) (summarizing Bickel Memorandum to
Frankfurter (1953)).
12. Id. at 654 (quoting Bickel Memorandum to Frankfurter (1953)).
13. Id. at 678-99.
14. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
15. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Hodgson, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (admission policies of racially
segregated private schools); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (racially
discriminatory labor practices under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Chinese students' right to English language instruction under Title
VII).
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tween judicial "finding" and "making" of law.' 7 It is not a question of
judicial institutional capacidy; it is rather one of judicial constitutional
legitimacy. But those lines and limits have been elusive in both defini-
tion and application ever since the Supreme Court's first term began in
1790 at the Royal Exchange Building in New York.'" To be sure, the
record is replete with honest efforts, often carefully reasoned and ar-
ticulated, to find and to draw such lines. 9 Among these efforts have
been: (1) the frank resort to judicial activism based on personal philo-
sophical commitments to policy goals;2" (2) reasoned endeavors to live
by the tenets of judicial restraint;2' (3) an avowed pragmatism about
17. Some would properly find it more forthright to speak of judicial "judging" and
judicial "legislating."
18. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 189 n.75 (3d ed. 1975) (detailing the
various physical, rather than philosophical, structures in which the Court has been housed
since 1790).
19. See, e.g., Justice Roberts' majority opinion in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I
(1936). In Butler, Justice Roberts wrote for the majority: "It is sometimes said that the court
assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the people's representatives. This is a
misconception. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by
the people. All legislation must conform to the principles its lays donl. When an act of
Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional
mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,--to lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its consid-
ered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the
power of judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its
delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accord-
ance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that,
its duty ends." Id. at 62-63.
20. See, e.g., Justice Douglas' jurisprudence throughout more than 36 years on the
Supreme Court, the longest tenure of any Justice in the history of the Court. For selected
excerpts from his opinions, see Mr. Justice Douglas, One Man's Opinions, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 3 (1976). For studies of his contributions to the development of various areas
of the law while serving on the Court, see e.g., Countryman, Justice Douglas' Contribution to
the Law Business Regulation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 366 (1974); Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas:
His Influence on Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 (1964); Powe, Evolu-
tion to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 371 (1974);
Wolfman, Silver & Silver, The Behavior ofJustice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 235 (1973); Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuali;: The Privacy Opin-
ions o/Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964): "[Tlhese decisions [on reapportionment] give support to a current
mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view,
in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitu-
tional 'principle,' and that this Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform when other
branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon
the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a
general haven for reform movements. The Constitution is an instrument of government,
fundamental to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the
greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in
[Vol 6.467
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the "felt necessities of the time"22 or "the mores of the day";2 3 (4) at-
tempts to follow an interpretative course based on a "literal" reading of
the Constitution;24 (5) protestations in favor of embracing a "sliding
scale of values"; 2 (6) a course of judicial response based upon the no-
tion of whether or not an action by government "shocks the con-
science";26 and (7) a diligent search for "neutral principles" of
constitutional law.27 The record also contains other efforts at viable
line drawing, although they are often similar or derivative. But the
seven just enumerated are illustrative of the dilemma and the ubiqui-
tous difficulties inherent in the search for definable limits to permissible
function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its
authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process.
For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the
Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view
of what should be so for the amending process." Id. at 624-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). The quoted phrase appears in the
following context: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed." Id.
23. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Gregg, Justice
Brennan remarked: "This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of our Constitution, to say whether, when individuals condemned to death stand
before our Bar, 'moral concepts' require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point
where we should declare that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the
screw, and the wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society." 428 U.S. at 229
(footnote omitted).
24. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring, joined by Douglas, J.) ("Both the history and language of the First Amendment
support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, with-
out censorship, injunction, or prior restraints." Id. at 717); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21
(1970). Rejecting the "traditional test" with its "rational basis" standard as well as the "fun-
damental rights test" with its standard of "compelling state interest," Justice Marshall pro-
posed a more flexible approach to equal protection analysis which would weigh competing
interests: "[Concentration must be placed on the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental
benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classifica-
tion." Id. at 520-21. See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975); Forun
Equal Protection andthe Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975). Compare Gun-
ther, The Supreme Court: 1971 Term; Forward- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Mdodelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
26. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
27. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. I
(1959).
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constitutional adjudication. It is a quest at once frustrating and contro-
versial. Yet it is one crucial to the exercise of the judicial function, to
the articulation of the appropriate judicial role in the American consti-
tutional constellation, and to an essayed response to charges such as
that recently voiced in the American Bar Association Journal that the
"United States Supreme Court has become our Legiscourt. Why not
candidly face that fact and let the justices decide issues on policy rather
than strained constitutional grounds? '28
I. The Development of the Double Standard
It is because Raoul Berger carefully enunicates and analyzes the
judicial role in the governmental process, thus once again bringing us
face to face with the eternal dilemma of the limits of judicial power,
that his work is so significant. Yet, at least in this observer's judgment,
his scholarship is far more important in illuminating the broader per-
spective than in the particular case study indicated by his subtitle. That
he would choose to focus on the transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment is quite natural, for it is at the heart of the present contro-
versy surrounding the judicial role in racial matters, pointing frankly to
the contemporary transformation of the imperative of equal opportu-
nity for individuals into guaranteed results based upon group statistics.
Notwithstanding his persuasive evidence on the raison d'etre of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is the primary title of Berger's work, Gov-
ernment by Judiciary, that poses the central question at issue. His con-
demnation of what he regards as past, present, and presumably future
bald resort to judicial government concerns--or certainly ought to con-
cern-all those who govern and who authorize governance. As a life-
long admirer and supporter of the United States judiciary in general,
and the Supreme Court at its apex in particular, and as one who views
the Court as the branch of government to which the people can look
with hope when the others falter or fail29-witness its decisive savior
role in the "Watergate" crisis-I nevertheless concur with the heart of
Berger's charge: that the judicial branch has indeed been guilty of en-
gaging in vital aspects of governmental policy formation that are con-
stitutionally delegated to other branches, particularly the legislature.
To voice that charge is tantamount to the acceptance of what is, or
should be, the primary salient fact of American constitutionalism: that
lawmaking is emphatically the province of the legislative branch, the
28. Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging? 63 A.B.A.J. 1212, 1215 (1977).
29. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 377-80.
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branch that by constitutional provision and philosophical design is the
keystone of the arch of representative democracy. The American Con-
stitution thus provides neither for a "pure" or "direct" democracy, nor
for an "aristocratic" or "elitist" regime.
For better or for worse, and it may well on occasion be the latter,
laws are designed to be made by the people's duly elected representa-
tives, assembled in Congress and the fifty state legislatures. Whatever
one may think of the merits of their performance-and they rarely re-
ceive a high mark from the sovereign people who sent them there-
elected representatives are replaceable via the electoral process, a proc-
ess vastly ameliorated and universalized in not inconsiderable measure
by the courts. And in extreme situations, the legislature's role, even the
legislative branch itself, is subject to change by constitutional amend-
ment, albeit not without some genuine toil and trouble. In other words,
while the Constitution requires adherence to its explicit and implicit
terms, it neither requires nor guarantees legislative wisdom-all it
mandates is that legislative (and executive) actions be performed in ac-
cordance with constitutional authority. As Justice Holmes once ob-
served: "We fully understand . . . the very powerful argument that
can be made against the wisdom of the legislation, but on that point we
have nothing to say, as it is not our concern."3 In typically colorful
fashion he once expressed this constitutional and judicial philosophy to
the then sixty-one year old Justice Stone: "Young man, about 75 years
ago I learned that I was not God. And so, when the people.., want
to do something I can't find anything in the Constitution expressly for-
bidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, 'Goddamit, let 'em.
do it.' 31
Felix Frankfurter, Holmes' disciple who would inherit the master's
chair and become one of the most ardent modern exponents of judicial
restraint32-- notwithstanding his lifelong personal commitment to civil
libertarianism-well articulated the heart of the matter long before he
ascended to the bench: "Even the most rampant worshipper of judicial
supremacy admits that wisdom and justice are not the tests of constitu-
30. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 575, 580 (1911).
31. C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 281 (1947) (quoting Justice Holmes). Or as
Holmes said to the famed constitutional lawyer John W. Davis on another occasion: "Of
course I know, and every other sensible man knows, that the Sherman [Antitrust Act of
1890] is damned nonsense, but if my country wants to go to hell, I am here to help it." F.
BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1961).
32. See, e.g., W. MENDELSON, FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE (1964).
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tionality."33 Once on the Court, he time and again lectured his col-
leagues and countrymen in the same vein, as when he dissented
vigorously from the Court's decision in Trop v. Dulles,34 which de-
clared unconstitutional a section of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1940:
It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail,
to disregard one's own strongly held view of what is wise in the
conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to pro-
nounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations
on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to
its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of
the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Consti-
tution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the
wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do.35
And in what is probably Justice Frankfurter's most famous exhortation
of judicial abstemiousness, he all but cried out in dissent in West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,36 the celebrated flag salute
case:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in
history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed
by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I
should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general liberta-
rian views in the Court's opinion [by Mr. Justice Jackson], repre-
senting as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as
judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor ag-
nostic. We owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are
equally bound by our judicial obligations whether we derive our
citizenship from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these
shores. As a member of this Court I am not justfled in writing my
private notions ofpolicy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply
Imay cherish them or how mischievous Imay deem their disregard
... . Most unwillingly, therefore, I must differ from my breth-
ren with regard to legislation like this. I cannot bring my mind to
believe that the "liberty" secured by the Due Process Clause
gives this Court authority to deny to the State of West Virginia
the attainment of that which we all recognize as a legitimate leg-
islative end, namely, the promotion of good citizenship, by em-
ployment of the means here chosen.3 7
Yet as Raoul Berger's indictment makes clear, even such oppo-
nents of "government by judiciary" as Justices Holmes and Frankfurter
33. Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, 43 New Repub. 85, 86
(1925).
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
35. Id. at 120 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
37. Id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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and their latter-day followers, such as Justices John Marshall Harlan
and Lewis Powell, are not absolved from the task of drawing the elu-
sive line between "appropriate" and "inappropriate" judicial action. 8
Thus, even avowed champions of judicial self-restraint have been will-
ing to embrace a judicial approach that unquestionably manifests a
"double standard" between judicial review of legislation touching upon
"economic-proprietarian questions" and that of legislative or executive
action affecting fundamental civil rights and liberties. 9 That "double
standard," however, is also susceptible to judicial rationalizations or
fiat that have resulted in "double standards" within "double stan-
dards."4" Hence, as early as 1937, so confirmed an exponent of judicial
restraint as Justice Cardozo created and spelled out in Palko v. Con-
necticut4' an "Honor Roll of Superior Rights"42 that in effect laid the
groundwork for both the theory and practice of a double standard in
the interpretation of constitutionally recognized human rights. In so
doing, Cardozo specified in tabular form those rights that did and those
that did not require close judicial scrutiny.43 The fundamental issue in
Palko was the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment; but the basis of the decision was the concept of "preferred
freedoms," a concept which would within a year be judicially recog-
nized and articulated by Justice Stone in his historic footnote to the
otherwise insignificant Carolene Products case.'
38. See notes 18-27 and accompanying text supra.
39. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 9-32 (tracing the formulation and justification of
the double standard).
40. Id. at 16-17.
41. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
42. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 66-69. The importance of this "Honor Roll" is
threefold: (1) it established guidelines by which to measure the incorporation problem; (2) it
provided judicial recognition of the claim that, at least in certain conditions, the states are
subject to the Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) it laid the groundwork
for support of the double standard theory and its subsequent application.
43. Id. at 70. For example, the First Amendment's separation of church and state was
deemed not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus not requiring close judi-
cial scrutiny.
44. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The footnote
reads in part: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Con-
stitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . .It is unnecessary to consider now whether
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. . . .Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
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The Stone formulation proved, not surprisingly, to be a veritable
Pandora's box. Avowed judicial activists such as Justices Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge,45 and Justice Black (who, however, rejected the
"judicial activist" label) quickly utilized it to justify judicial interpreta-
tions of constitutional phraseology that would undoubtedly have
amazed the framers. Yet had not Holmes himself, almost six decades
prior to Palko and Carolene Products, spoken of "[t]he felt necessities
of the time"?46 Had he not specifically suggested that jurists "should
not be too rigidly bound to the tenets of judicial self-restraint in cases
involving civil liberties"?47 Indeed, is it not wholly feasible to justify
this "double standard" on the grounds of (1) the crucial nature of basic
freedoms, (2) the explicit language of the Bill of Rights, (3) the exper-
tise of the judiciary in matters involving the maintenance of fundamen-
tal liberties, and (4) the discrepancy in access to the political process
between the "haves" and the "have nots"?48 Obviously, a host of Jus-
tices have been comfortable in accepting and propounding these justifi-
cations and have ruled accordingly.49
Since 1937, the "double standard" has expanded in favor of judi-
cial interpretative powers that would, I suggest, have troubled both
Holmes and Cardozo as well as other early proponents of that stan-
dard. Although it began with the latter Warren Court years,50 this ex-
pansion was, ironically, articulated most frequently by the
"conservative" Burger Court beginning in the late 1960's and continu-
ing into the 1970's.51 It has taken the form of what is unquestionably a
"double standard" within a "double standard"-a patent manifestation
of "government by judiciary," whatever one may think of its merits.
Ever since 1937, civil rights and liberties issues have been accorded
closer judicial examination than those in the economic-proprietarian
realm. Upon a demonstration that a statutory classification affects
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry." (citations omitted).
45. These Justices reached the Court within three years after Carolene Products was
decided.
46. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
47. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 30 & n.88.
48. Id. at 24-32.
49. 1d.
50. Id. at 16-17. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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"fundamental interests"52 or utilizes a "suspect category," 53 or where
the classification is not considered "suspect" but is nonetheless subject
to more than the minimal level of review,54 the Court will now examine
the statute with closer judicial scrutiny. Once an issue has thus been
deemed to require an enhanced level of "scrutiny," the Court in effect
shifts the burden of proof of constitutionality to the legislature and/or
the executive and requires a showing of a compelling or important in-
terest in support of the classification, thereby rejecting the traditional
equal protection (and due process) test of whether the legislature had a
"reasonable" or "rational" basis for the classification.5 Judicial proce-
dural and substantive policymaking of this sort is both an open invita-
tion for further judicial activism and grist for the mill of Berger's
indictment. It is tailor-made for the blurring of epistemological distinc-
tions between constitutionally permissible and impermissible actions
by the political branches of the government. It puts a premium on wis-
dom and fairness, neither of which, no matter how desirable and logi-
cal, is required by the terms of the Constitution of the United States.
II. Activism and Restraint: The Problem of Drawing a Viable
Line
Infinitely more difficult than stipulating the foregoing facts of gov-
52. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights).
53. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court iden-
tified a "suspect class" implicating strict judicial scrutiny as one "saddled with such disabili-
ties, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. Compare note 44 supra.
Strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), as well as national origin or
alienage, see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). More problematic has
been the Court's treatment of illegitimacy. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968). Illegitimacy was apparently eliminated as a suspect class by the Court's decisions in
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 531 (1976) and Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506
(1976). For the Court's current difficulties in reviewing classifications based on legitimacy,
compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) with Lalli v. Lalli 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978). For
a detailed discussion of Trimble and the search for the appropriate standard of review, see
Constitutional Review: Supreme Court, 1976-77 Term, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 61, 114-21
(1978).
54. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (all dealing with sex discrimination). But f.
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (gender-
based classifications designed to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women
upheld).
55. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 16-17.
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ernmental and constitutional life regarding the nature of the judicial
process and the judicial role is the quest for a viable line between judi-
cial activism and judicial restraint. I am not persuaded that Raoul Ber-
ger has succeeded in doing so in Government by Judiciary-and it may
conceivably be impossible. In effect, Berger's solution amounts to the
entirely commendable exhortation that judges stay within the limits of
their constitutionally assigned judicial function and base their judg-
ments solely upon that which is constitutionally permitted by the au-
thority inherent in the basic charter ratified in 1789.
It would be difficult to quarrel with that exhortation, and even
most extreme judicial activists, both on and off the bench, would very
likely be willing to say "Amen!" to it. The problem with this solution is
the twofold one of interpretation of constitutional language and the tai-
loring of the judicial function to the limits of that language. The day is
gone where there would still be serious challenges to the existence of
the ultimate judicial power, that of judicial review,56 for judicial review
is clearly a fact of governmental life that has been settled by the sweep
of history.57 While challenges to its justification continue, they are aca-
demic; the presence and continuation of judicial review in our system
of separation of powers and checks and balances is assured. Berger
does not challenge it;58 what he does understandably and justifiably
challenge is the application of judicial review to the perception of the
judicial role in general, and to specific cases and controversies-such as
that of the transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment-in particu-
lar. His is a cry of "Halt!" and, while recognizing the futility of undo-
ing what has already been done, Berger wants the judicial branch to
return to principles of self-restraint, of abstemiousness, and of what
Justice Frankfurter was fond of calling "judicial humilitarianism."
It is one thing to second and applaud Berger's clarion call as a
general beacon to guide judicial conduct, but it is quite another to rest
adherence to it on the unbending keystone of the original intention of
the drafters of the Constitution--even if that intent were clearly ascer-
tainable in every instance, which demonstrably it is not.59 What is
needed is a line that would permit the invocation of the spirit as well as
the letter of a constitutional provision without engaging in the kind of
judicial prescriptive policy making that, during the past two genera-
56. The penultimate judicial power, that of statutory construction, has never been seri-
ously challenged except in its application to specific cases.
57. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 279-314. The analysis found at 304-14 is espe-
cially applicable.
58. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 355.
59. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
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tions, has emanated from the Court's "right" wing (e.g., the four anti-
New Deal "Horsemen"), the Court's "left" wing (e.g., the contempo-
rary civil libertarian activism of Justices Douglas, Brennan and Mar-
shall), and even from its "center" (e.g., the actions of Justices
Blackmun, Stewart and Powell in such policy making opinions as the
1973 Abortion Cases,6° the 1976 Private School Admissions Case,6" and
the 1978-9 Reverse Discrimination Cases).62 The sought after yet elu-
sive line must above all underscore a resolute commitment to an abjur-
ing both of decision making based upon personal philosophical
commitments and value judgments and of the understandable instinct
to reach out and settle issues that may well require determination but
which have not been resolved by the people's elected representatives.
Searching for and evaluating the inherent spirit as well as the pat-
ent letter of a constitutional provision need not result in an impermissi-
ble enlargement of the judicial role-no matter how tempting that
enlargement may be as a means to expedite needed political or eco-
nomic reform. Thus, although the need for a hallmark decision such as
that articulating the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to coun-
sel in all criminal cases6" is beyond rational argument, the Court, "the
Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal," should not in consequence be
viewed, as Justice Frankfurter put it, as "a super-legal aid bureau."' 4
Some, albeit certainly not all, aspects of Miranda v. Arizona65 would
seem to mandate such an approach, for in Miranda the Court wrote at
least a partial code of police conduct into the Constitution.66 Similarly,
it is defensible for the Court to rule unconstitutional crass gender dis-
crinmination, such as that found in Reed v. Reed,67 for the statute at
issue there, which favored the appointment of male administrators for
decedents' estates, constituted an example of a clear-cut, irrational and
sexually discriminatory classification. But the Court should not view
itself as a "social reform agency"-a position seemingly propounded
when it wrote what, in effect, constitutes a Federal Abortion Code in its
60. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
62. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Steelworkers v. Weber,
47 U.S.L.W. 4851 (1979).
63. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (right to pro se representation).
64. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1948).
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. Id. at 467-73. The Court in Miranda set forth the well known "Miranda instruc-
tions," requiring that persons in custody be informed of specific rights prior to police
interrogation.
67. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Spring 1979] 479
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
controversial Roe6" and Doe69 decisions. No matter how much one
may applaud the results reached in Roe and Doe, it was the task of
legislatures to overhaul then existing abortion laws; the fact that it was
a difficult, delicate, and politically hazardous issue neither mandates
nor excuses judicial intervention.
The distinction between reliance on intent and spirit can be illus-
trated by reference to the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Whereas Pro-
fessor Berger's historically accurate reading of the intention of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would, if followed to the letter,
have perpetuated injustice, reliance on the basis and spirit for its enact-
ment rendered constitutionally permissible the Court's biting of the
proverbial bullet of endemic, governmentally mandated racial segrega-
tion, culminating in the historic decisions in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion7° and Brown 11.71 But the Court had no constitutional mandate to
turn itself and the lower rungs of the judiciary into a combination of
national school board,72 transportation expert, 3 disciplinarian,74 em-
757ployment manager,  and admissions director.76 It was similarly con-
stitutionally spirited and comprehensible for the Court, as it did in
Baker v. Carr,77 to rule justiciable the question of apportionment and
redistricting based upon the letter and spirit of the post-Civil War suf-
frage amendments. But it is hardly clear that the letter and spirit of
these amendments justify the kind of historical reasoning reflected in
Wesberry v. Sanders78 two years after Baker, and they certainly do not
justify the sort of "judicial election supervisory board" rationalizations
that have prompted federal courts to thrown out entire units of local
government based on arguable allegations of practices of invidious
discrimination.79
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
70. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
72. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
73. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
74. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
75. Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
76. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
77. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
78. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court in Wesberry struck down a Georgia apportionment
statute which it found debased the voting rights of residents in one district of the state due to
greater population density than was found elsewhere in the state.
79. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
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Conclusion
What, then, of a viable line? Unfortunately there is none, nor can
there be one. I submit, however, that one can endeavor to delineate the
Court's proper role based on the two-pronged principle of identifying
institutional role commitments and meritorious court personnel.
Neither lends itself to facile articulation, yet neither is beyond ascer-
tainable outline. With respect to the former, the members of the judi-
cial branch must ever be aware that the basic role of "the least
dangerous branch""0 of the government is that of saying "yes" or, more
dramatically, "no" to the other branches, be they on the federal or state
level. The courts must resolutely shun prescriptive policymaking.
Ours, to be sure-and fortunately-is not a "pure" democracy;
equally fortunately, ours is not characterized by Blackstonian legisla-
tive supremacy. Our system of separation of powers and checks and
balances is through design a sound one, notwithstanding recurrent
strains and even excesses. But our constitutional democracy, based
upon majoritarian rule with due regard for minority rights, does not
shroud the judicial branch with the mantle of Platonic guardians.81
Our judicial branch, with the Supreme Court at its apex, is the greatest
institutional and constitutional safeguard we possess; only those com-
mitted to libertarian suicide would sanction a transfer of the judicial
guardianship of our basic civil rights and liberties to either the legisla-
ture or the executive or both! That does not mean, however, that the
judiciary is or should be empowered to govern. It can and does serve
as an arbiter, a check, a guardian, even a teacher "in a vital [constitu-
tional] seminar,"8 but it must do so by embracing those parameters of
constitutional obligations that inhere in its role. Raoul Berger's exces-
sive literalism is no answer, but his exhortations to hew to the text, if
coupled with something Berger rejects, namely the text's spirit, may
bring us close to one.
The quest for limits will be successful only if the judiciary is pre-
pared to abide by the commendable maxims of judicial restraint, so
well articulated by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ash-
wander83 more than four decades ago, 4 and if the Court views its func-
80. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
81. See W. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974).
82. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208
(1952).
83. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
84. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 354-76. This section of the book sets forth the
"Sixteen Great Maxims of Judicial Self-Restraint."
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tion as an abstemious, passive one characterized by what Professor
Louis Lusky calls the application of "tentative" judicial powerY Rec-
ognizing these limits assuredly would not prevent the Court from
wielding its necessary constitutional club, as it did amidst all but uni-
versal cheers in dispatching Richard Nixon into resignation as a result
of its seminal holding in United States v. Nixon, 6 and as it did in such
landmark rulings as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,87 Brown
v. Board of Education,88 Baker v. Carr89 and Gideon i'. Wainwright."
It is thus both obvious and appropriate that, in accordance with
the authority implicit in Article III, the judiciary periodically revises,
even revolutionizes, the Constitution. But it may and must do so only
in the presence of appropriate letter and spirit constitutional authority;
natural law-like commitments to personalized notions of "justice,"
without more, are barred. Ad hoc conceptualizations and implementa-
tions of what may very well be desirable national or state policy goals
are no warrant for stepping outside the proper institutional role and
function. In none of its components or levels is the judiciary empow-
ered to act as a superlegislature, 91 no matter how inviting such a course
may be. Self-restraint by the courts in lawmaking is their seminal con-
tribution to democratic society. The temptations to stray are manifold
and human, yet they must be eschewed-lest the guardian of the Con-
stitution find itself emasculated by hostile action.
Of course, the jurists who render the decisions are human beings
as to whom, in Justice Benjamin Cardozo's poignant words, "[tihe great
tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in
their course, and pass . ..by."92 Still, as the sage Alexis de Toc-
queville observed in his prescient Democracy in America:
Federal judges ... must not only be good citizens and men of
education and integrity, qualities necessary for all magistrates,
but [they] must also be statesmen; they must know how to under-
stand the spirit of the age, to confront those obstacles that can be
overcome . . [but they must also be able] to steer out of the
current when the tide threatens to carry them away, and with
85. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGrHT? 47-50, 361-66 (1975).
86. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (President does not possess absolute, unqualified privilege of
immunity from judicial process).
87. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down executive action seizing steel mills to avert a
nationwide strike which was deemed harmful to national defense interests).
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
90. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
91. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
92. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
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them the sovereignty of the union and obedience to its laws.93
To achieve James Madison's call for a "bench happily filled," 94 the
men and women who staff the judiciary in general, and the Supreme
Court in particular, must above all be public servants that are endowed
with incontestible merit. For professional merit constitutes the essen-
tial qualification for judicial office-all others ought to be of lesser or
no importance to the appointing executive and the confirming house of
the legislature. As I have endeavored to demonstrate in a book-length
political history of appointments to the Supreme Court95-and, by im-
plication, to the lower federal bench-the following five criteria proved
to be the most apparent and most significant in the selection processes
that underlay the 101 appointments to the highest court in the land
through 1975, the date of the last appointment: (1) objective merit; (2)
personal friendship; (3) balancing group and constituency "representa-
tion" on the Court---e.g., geography, religion, race and sex; (4) political
and ideological compatability; and (5) judicial experience.96
There is no need to belabor each of these here. Suffice it to plead,
however, that whatever the political and sociological realities of the day
may be, the central consideration in the eyes of those charged with the
selection and confirmation process ought to be that first category-that
of indisputable professional and personal merit and integrity. If we
cannot expect such qualities in those selected to serve on the bench,
where can we? If this assumption cum exhortation be regarded as un-
realistic, perhaps naive, it is nonetheless an irreducible goal that ought
not to be compromised if our aim is really to achieve a meaningful
commitment to and expression of a judicial role designed to attain
equal justice under law. To be sure, other considerations necessarily
underlie the decisive characteristics and qualifications of a putative ap-
pointee besides those three advanced by Justice Frankfurter, namely
that the future justice be a "philosopher, historian, and prophet."97 Yet
Frankfurter was essentially correct when he argued that neither judicial
experience, political affiliation, nor geographic, racial, gender or reli-
gious considerations ought to play a significant role.
There have been some recent developments that would appear to
point toward a more formally committed embrace of merit considera-
93. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (J. Mayer ed. 1966).
94. J. MADISON, IV LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 349-50 (1884).
95. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS (1974).
96. Id at 3-63.
97. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror ofJustices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781
(1957). To this list could be added the requirement that a future Justice be "a person of
inordinate patience." (Justice Brennan's statement to author, May 19, 1964).
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tions in the selection of jurists. Thus, in some twenty states United
States Senators have established advisory appointment panels for
members of the federal district bench. And very early in his adminis-
tration, President Carter established by executive order the "United
States Circuit Judge Nomination Commission.""8 Composed of thir-
teen panels, one for each of the federal circuits but with two each for
the large Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Commission was charged with
nominating to the President "as circuit judges persons whose character,
experience, ability and commitment to equal justice under law, fully
qualify them to serve in the Federal judiciary."9 9 In line with this com-
mendable aim, and armed with guidelines on their face based indispu-
tably upon merit, the thirteen eleven-member panels were created and
went to work. Yet proverbial eyebrow raising by students of the ap-
pointment process took place immediately in the face of the specified
membership requirement that "[each] panel include members of both
sexes, members of minority groups, and approximately equal numbers
of lawyers and nonlawyers."''  Whatever the merits of these con-
temporarily prevalent considerations may be-and they are arguably
meritorious requirements of the first magnitude-the not entirely
astonishing results have been to focus upon, and emphasize, those "rep-
resentative" requirements, often at the expense of the arguably more
significant one of basic professional merit, with some of the panels en-
gaging in heated arguments involving charges of "quotas" and "reverse
discrimination."'' 0 I
At this writing, it is too early to essay a judgment, and it would be
unscholarly to endeavor predictions. But it is hardly comforting to ob-
serve that the results of almost two years of experience with the panels
indicate that much, in some cases most, of the questioning of the candi-
dates by panel members has related to political, social and economic
ideologies; that personal views on substantive questions have consti-
tuted the gravamen of the inquiries. One of the critics of the Fourth
Circuit nominating panel, Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Associate Editor of the
Washington Star, recounted the "baffling" experience of "an old and
valued personal friend," whom he characterized as "the brightest
young state jurist to emerge in North Carolina since [the now Con-
98. Exec. Order No. 11,972,3 C.F.R. 96-99 (1977), reprintedin 28 US.C.A. § 44 app., at
69-70 (Supp. 1978), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1978).
99. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949, § 1.
100. Id § 2(c).
101. Slotnick, What Panelists are Saying About the Circuit Judge Nominating Commis-
sion, 62 JUD. 320 (1978).
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gressman] Richardson L. Preyer."' 2 The panel, Mr. Yoder wrote,
"asked no questions about his attitudes toward the judicial process, or
tending to reveal judicial temperament. He was, however, asked for
personal views on substantive questions: abortion, women's rights,
'state sovereignty,' and the Bakke case."' 3
It is a sober thought that the proposed Omnibus Judgeship Act of
197814 has afforded President Carter the unprecedented opportunity to
effect at one fell swoop a one-third increase in the federal judiciary by
filling the thirty-five new circuit court of appeals and 117 district court
judgeships the bill establishes. It is an opportunity fraught with re-
sponsibility-an opportunity to raise genuine professional merit to an
unprecedented level or to enshrine a different kind of "politicization"
into the judicial branch, one that would largely substitute notions of
currently fashionable "representativeness" for the latter-day practice of
chiefly rewarding political fealty. By August 1, 1979, the Carter ap-
pointments comprised one-third non-white and female; their political
affiliation was 97.3% Democratic. This is not to say that the presence of
either or both factors vitiates the possibility of the emergence of over-
riding professional competence, as the history of judicial appointments
has frequently manifested-thanks in no small measure to that com-
mendable judicial independence that comes with the constitutionally
enshrined safeguards on tenure and related appurtenances. 10 5
However one may evaluate Raoul Berger's trenchant indictment
of the contemporary nature of the judicial process and role, whatever
one may think of the viability of his prescriptions for redress, there can
be no doubt that judges must consider themselves bound by the "max-
ims of judicial restraint," by an abiding dedication to the attainment of
"equal justice under law" rather than that of "justice at any cost," and
the knowledge that judges, in fine, "are appointed to 'defend the Con-
stitution,' not to revise it."' 0 6 Those called upon to perform the judicial
role thus must, above all, be clothed with demonstrable professional
merit, ever alive to the sage admonition of Justice John Marshall
Harlan in his memorable dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims,10 7
that the "Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public
102. Fish, Questioning Judicial Candidates: What Can Merit Selection Ask, 62 JUD. 8, 11
(1978).
103. Yoder, Jr., Screening Judicial Candidates: New Politics in "Merit Selection" The
News & Observer, Dec. 8, 1977, at 5.
104. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978).
105. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 95.
106. Berger, Academe vs. the Founding-Fathers, 30 NAT'L REv. 15, 471 (Apr. 14, 1978).
107. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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welfare; nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought
of as a general haven for reform movements."'' 0 8
108. Id at 624-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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